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MATTEO GARGANI 
UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT AND WELTANSCHAUUNG. 
REMARKS ON LUKÁCS’ LATE WRITINGS ON MARXISM 
ABSTRACT: From 1930 onwards, György Lukács considers ‘uneven development’ the 
typical relational form between economic progress and the corresponding evolution of 
other fields of human activity. In the early thirties Lukács focuses on the problem of 
elaborating an independent Marxist aesthetics, but then necessarily find himself having to 
deal with the general configuration of Marx’s alleged philosophy. The general theory 
illustrated in The Ontology of Social Being is where this philosophy, considered as a 
Weltanschauung, is given its final framework. His reflection on the ‘specificity’ of the 
aesthetic experience, as part of the broader framework of the main fields of art, science and 
everyday life, is the theoretical medium Lukács used in the fifties and sixties to fine-tune 
the need that had arisen decades earlier to attribute Marxism with genuine philosophical 
universality. 
SOMMARIO: A partire dal 1930 György Lukács considera lo ‘sviluppo ineguale’ la forma 
relazionale tipica tra sviluppo economico e la corrispettiva evoluzione degli altri ambiti 
dell’attività umana. Nei primi anni trenta Lukács si concentra nell’elaborazione di 
un’autonoma estetica marxista, trovandosi così necessariamente innanzi al problema della 
configurazione complessiva di una presunta filosofia di Marx. La teoria generale illustrata 
ne L’Ontologia dell’essere sociale è il luogo in cui a tale filosofia, considerata come una 
Weltanschauung, è restituita la sua definitiva configurazione. La riflessione di Lukács sulla 
‘specificità’ dell’esperienza estetica, intesa come elemento del più ampio ambito di arte, 
scienza e vita quotidiana, è lo strumento teoretico da lui approntato negli anni cinquanta e 
sessanta al fine di perfezionare l’esigenza sorta decenni addietro di attribuire al marxismo 
un’autentica universalità filosofica.  
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Introduction1 
Economic geography talks about ‘uneven development’ to describe 
economic growth as a multi-speed process at the antipodes of a dynamic 
synchronically involving several areas of the globe.2 ‘Uneven development’ 
plays a crucial theoretical role in the late Lukács, and yet his interpretation 
is very different to the aforementioned, eminently theoretical terms.3 In a 
letter to Werner Hofmann dated 4 February 1966, Lukács states: 
I believe that one of the most important reasons for the dead end of current social 
sciences is the desire to instil in each individual example a false antinomy between law 
and development; instead I believe that one of Marx’s greatest achievements is to have 
discovered uneven development. The latter has very profound ontological roots.4  
Lukács makes a double statement. The first, unequivocal statement is that 
‘uneven development’ is not a minor issue for Marx, but one of his most 
                                                                          
1 Abbreviations: GLW = G. Lukács, Werke, Neuwied-Berlin, Luchterhand, 1962-
1986 (Bielefeld, Aisthesis, 2005-). HGW = G.W.F. Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, ed. 
Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Hamburg, Meiner, 1968-. 
MECW = K. Marx, F. Engels, Collected Works, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1975-
2005. MEGA2 = Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, ed. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus 
beim ZK der KPdSU and Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Berlin-
Moscow, 1975-1990 (ed. Internationale Marx-Engels-Stiftung, Berlin-Boston, de Gruyter 
Akademie Forschung, 1991-). MEW = K. Marx, F. Engels, Werke, ed. Institut für 
Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1957-1990. [Where 
standard English translation is not available, I use my own German-Italian translation 
(Italian-English translation is by E. Young). In this case only, I have retained the original 
German in footnotes to enable the reader to compare the translation with the original].  
2 N. Smith, Uneven Development. Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space, 
Athens (Georgia)-London, The University of Georgia Press, 2008.  
3 Althusser is the other Marxist author who used ‘overdetermined contradiction’ to 
enhance the problem of ‘uneven development’ in an eminently theoretical perspective: “So 
uneven development [développement inégal] (that is, these same phenomena of 
displacement and condensation observable in the development process of a complex 
whole) is not external to contradiction, but constitutes its most intimate essence” (L. 
Althusser, Pour Marx, 1965, Paris, La Découverte, 1996, p. 219-220, trans. B. Brewster, 
For Marx, London-New York, Verso, 2005, p. 213). On this point, cf. G. Elliott, 
Althusser. The Detour of Theory, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2006, p. 131-132 and L. Ferretter, 
Louis Althusser, London-New York, Routledge, 2006, p. 45-46.  
4 “Ich glaube, es ist eine der wichtigsten Ursachen der Sackgasse in den heutigen 
Sozialwissenschaften, daß man eine falsche Antinomie von Gesetzlichkeit und 
Entwicklung im Einzelfall aufstellt; ich glaube dagegen, dass die Entdeckung der 
ungleichmässigen Entwicklung eine der größten Errungenschaften von Marx ist. Sie hat 
sehr tief gehende ontologische Gründe” (J. Bayer, ed., Ist der Sozialismus noch zu retten? 
Briefwechsel zwischen Georg Lukács und Werner Hofmann, Budapest, T-Twins Verlag, 
1991, p. 58).  
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important breakthroughs.5 The second more esoteric statement is that 
‘uneven development’ depends on “very profound ontological roots”. 
What exactly does Lukács refer to here? In essence he believes that the 
genesis and role of the concept of law has to be reconsidered in order to 
overcome the relationship between law and development as antinomic 
poles/forms of relationships Lukács judges to be still dominant in current 
social sciences. However, he believes that this requires a review of the 
ontological problem. Lukács’ Ontology of Social Being (published 
posthumously) and its Prolegomena are books in which he performs an in-
depth analysis of these issues. 
The concept of ‘uneven development’ is a key point in Lukács’ works 
between the thirties and fifties. During that period he exploits the fourth 
part of Marx’s famous unpublished Introduction (1857), and in particular 
the concepts of ‘unequal development’ and ‘uneven development’,6 chiefly 
to corroborate the theory of relative autonomy of the field of art vis-à-vis 
the field of economics.7 It is only with the “ontology of social being” – the 
                                                                          
5 The first theoretical meaning of the concept of ‘uneven development’ in Lukács is 
dated 1924-1925: “The following expositions, however, show that art is really an example, 
and the same unequal developments can emerge between law and production. An insoluble 
problem ensues only for mechanical bourgeois thought – which has to remain trapped in the 
fetishistic antinomy of ‘eternal iron laws’ or ‘unique individuality’” (G. Lukács, Chvostismus 
und Dialektik, 1924-1925 Posth., Budapest, Áron Verlag, 1996, p. 55-56, trans. E. Leslie, 
Tailism and the Dialectic, London, Verso, 2000, p. 108. Trans. mod.)  
6 “The unequal relation [unegales Verhältniß] of the development of material 
production and e.g. art. In general, the concept of progress is not to be taken in the usual 
abstract form. With regard to art, etc., this disproportion is not so important and [non to] 
difficult to grasp as within practical social relations themselves, e.g. in culture. Relation of 
the United States to Europe. However, the really difficult point to be discussed here is how 
the relations of production as legal relations enter into uneven development [ungleiche 
Entwicklung]” (K. Marx, Einleitung zu den „Grundrissen der Kritik der politischen 
Ökonomie“, 1857, in MEGA2, sect. II, vol. 1/1, p. 44, transl. E. Wangermann, Introduction, 
in MECW, vol. 28, p. 46).  
7 “For Marx the concept of the objectivity of artistic forms here too offered the basis 
for the analysis of the historical and social factors in the generation of artistic forms. His 
emphasis on the law of uneven development [ungleichmäßige Entwicklung], on the fact 
that ‘certain flourishing periods (of art) by no means stand in direct relation to the general 
social development’, shows that he saw in those periods of extraordinary creative activity 
(the Greeks, Shakespeare) objective culminations in the development of art and that he 
considered artistic value as objectively recognizable and definable” (G. Lukács, Kunst und 
objektive Wahrheit, 1934, in GLW, vol. 4, p. 637, trans. A. D. Kahn, Art and Objective 
Truth, in Id., Writer & Critic and Other Essays, A.D. Kahn, ed., London, Merlin, 1970, p. 
56). The quote from Marx to which Lukács refers is Marx, Einleitung, p. 44, trans. cit., 
Introduction, p. 46). For further textual references of ‘uneven development 
[ungleichmäßige Entwicklung]’, see G. Lukács, Friedrich Engels als Literaturhistoriker und 
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general theory of society Lukács outlines in his voluminous posthumous 
works – that uneven development acquires a different, and in some ways 
innovative theoretical function.8 
1. Marx philosopher and Weltbild. The load-bearing axes of his change of 
direction in 1930 
Unless one is familiar with the fundamental traits of Lukács’ Marxism 
from 1930 onwards it is impossible to understand the role of ‘uneven 
development’ in his late works. The thirties were an important watershed 
not only in the evolution of Lukács’ personal philosophy, but also in his 
interpretation of Marx.9 
Lukács’ interpretation of Marx after 1930 rests on two important 
pillars. Firstly, he states that in Marx certain theses are typically – and more 
or less implicitly – philosophical.10 Although the premises for this 
statement were already present in many of Lukács’ contributions from the 
thirties onwards, he unambiguously makes this statement in Ontology. He 
believes that Marx is not only an author well-versed in socioeconomics, but 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Literaturkritiker, 1935, in GLW, vol. 10, p. 505; Id., Franz Mehring (1846-1919), 1934, 
in GLW, vol. 10, p. 401; Id., Einführung in die ästhetischen Schriften von Marx und Engels, 
1946, in GLW, vol. 10, p. 401, trans. A. D. Kahn, Marx and Engels on Aesthetics, in Id., 
Art and Objective Truth, p. 66-67; Id., Der junge Hegel und die Probleme der 
kapitalistischen Gesellschaft, 1948 (2nd edition 1954), in GLW, vol. 8, p. 27, trans. R. 
Livingstone, The Young Hegel. Studies in the Relation between Dialectics and Economics, 
London, Merlin, 1975, p. xxvi; Id., Die Zerstörung der Vernunft, 1954, in GLW, vol. 9, p. 
517, trans. P. R. Palmer, The Destruction of Reason, London, Merlin, 1981, p. 597.  
8 It’s no accident that the notion of ‘uneven development’ appears in the title of two 
small excerpts from the Ontology of Social Being published by Lukács in the sixties, see Id., 
“Die Sowjetunion ist nicht typisch. Zur Theorie der ungleichmäßigen Entwicklung bei 
Marx I”, Neues Forum, 160-161, 1967, p. 344-347 and Id., “Geschichte und Literatur. Zur 
Theorie der ungleichmäßigen Entwicklung bei Marx II”, Neues Forum, 162-163, 1967, p. 
518-522.  
9 For a more in-depth presentation of the main points behind Lukács’ turn in the 
thirties, see G. Oldrini, György Lukács e i problemi del marxismo del Novecento, Napoli, La 
Città del Sole, 2009, p. 129-169.  
10 “Our later and more detailed discussion will clearly demonstrate the feebleness of a 
contrast of this kind between the young, philosophical, Marx and the later pure economist 
with no specific standpoint. We shall see that Marx in no way became ‘less philosophical’, 
but on the contrary significantly deepened his philosophical conceptions in all fields” (G. 
Lukács, Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins I, in GLW, vol. 13, p. 567, trans. D. 
Fernbach, The Ontology of Social Being 2. Marx’s basic ontological principles, London, 
Merlin, 1978, p. 11).  
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also a supporter of decisive philosophical theses.11 The notion that Marx is a 
philosopher is the first pillar on which Lukács’ interpretation of Marx rests 
after 1930. The second pillar of his interpretation is closely linked to the 
first, i.e., a concept of philosophy as knowledge aimed at reflecting a 
“universal image of the world [allgemeines Weltbild]”.12 Marxism as the 
concept of a universal and self-sufficient philosophy (i.e., not in need of 
‘integrations’ by Kant or others) is the guiding light of Lukács’ research from 
1930 onwards. The late Lukács considers Marxism a container he fills with 
the concept of autonomous philosophy not directly derivable from Marx. 
In Ontology Lukács objects to certain considerations by Rudolf 
Carnap: his objections provide more information about the meaning of 
this Weltbild which he defines as the “homogeneous reflection of existing 
reality, an image of the world”.13 Until the late fifties Lukács uses the 
expression Weltanschauung to refer to Marxism; later this term evolves 
into Weltbild. In both cases it is nevertheless important to emphasise how 
he never considered these concepts as subjectivistic, i.e., as a free choice of 
the perspective with which to view reality. As a result, in Lukács the 
meaning of the earlier Weltanschauung and the later Weltbild is radically 
different to the meaning Adorno attributes to these terms in his 
Philosophical Terminology.14 
In 1930, and from then onwards, Lukács always bases his idea of 
philosophy as the “universal image of the world” on Marx. Only if one 
understands this double level – interpretative regarding Marx and personal 
regarding Lukács – is it possible to genuinely assess his ideas during the 
latter part of his life. Apart from the aforementioned interpretative 
problem, there is another key problem: starting in the thirties, Lukács uses 
the term ‘Historical Materialism’ to present his personal interpretation of 
Marxism as Weltbild. However, the latter – which was to emerge clearly 
only in Ontology of Social Being – presupposes specific considerations 
regarding the relationship between social being and general ontology 
                                                                          
11 Id., Gelebtes Denken, 1969-1971, in GLW, vol. 18, p. 123-124, trans. R. 
Livingstone, Record of a Life, London, Verso, 1983, p. 86.  
12 G. Lukács, Zur Ontologie I, in GLW, vol. 13, p. 330.  
13 “eine zusammengehörige Widerspiegelung der an sich seienden Wirklichkeit, ein 
Weltbild” (ibid., p. 349). To some extent, in accordance with Lukács theses on Carnap is 
G. Szécsi, “Knowledge, reality and manipulation. György Lukács on the social 
epistemological context of the neopositivist rejection of ontology”, Studies in East 
European Thought, 67 (1-2), 2015, p. 31-39.  
14 T.W. Adorno, Philosophische Terminologie. Zur Einleitung, Frankfurt a. M., 
Suhrkamp, 1973, p. 118.  
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(involving inorganic and organic being); these considerations cannot be 
immediately deduced from the ‘materialistic concept of history’.  
2. Marx’s three ‘fundamental ontological statements’ 
In both Ontology and Prolegomena Lukács proposes a key thesis: the 
presence of three ‘fundamental ontological statements’ in Marx.15 It is not 
easy to establish a direct link between the three ‘fundamental ontological 
statements’ and the original contexts from which Lukács intends to deduce 
them. Although the three statements appear in different posthumous 
ontological works, in this essay I shall refer to Lukács’ unitary presentation 
in several consecutive paragraphs of the Prolegomena. Marx’s first 
fundamental ontological statement – ‘objectivity’ – is described as follows: 
The so far often introduced fundamental ontological statements [Marx’s statements, 
author’s note] must act as a starting point. First and foremost, that a being can be 
considered a being, when it is from all points of view something that is objectively 
determined. An indeterminate being is simply a product of the mind: an abstraction 
from all the determinations the totality of which is the only thing that makes a being 
what it is.16  
The first principle enunciates the theory that a being is always something 
that is ‘objectively determined’, in other words each individual being is 
always something irreducible and individual. Lukács uses this statement to 
try and achieve a dual goal: on the one hand he wants to maintain an 
ontological perspective, on the other he intends to distance himself from 
any argument based on the concept of the existence of a ‘being in general’.17 
                                                                          
15 Lukács, Prolegomena zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins, in GLW, vol. 13, p. 
126. Lukács identifies three ontological ‘levels’ (inorganic, organic and social being). These 
levels are genetically linked (the first is the basis of the second and the second is the basis 
of the third), but each maintains its own traits; the traits of the first ‘level’ are maintained 
in the upper levels, but not vice versa, see ibid., p. 326-327. For a more in-depth discussion 
of the three ‘fundamental ontological statements’, see M. Gargani, Produzione e filosofia. 
Sul concetto di ontologia in Lukács, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York, Olms, 2017, p. 73-252.  
16 “Als Ausgangspunkt müssen seine schon bis jetzt oft angeführten grundlegenden 
ontologischen Feststellungen dienen. Vor allem, daß das Sein nur dann als Sein betrachtet 
werden kann, wenn es ein in jeder Hinsicht objektiv bestimmtes ist. Ein bestimmungsloses 
Sein ist bloß ein Denkprodukt: eine Abstraktion von allen Bestimmungen, deren 
Totalität das Sein erst zum Sein macht” (Lukács, Prolegomena, p. 126-127).  
17 See ibid., p. 115. Lukács’ key critique here is Hegel’s ‘pure being’ described at the 
beginning of the first Section of his Logic: “Being, pure being – without further 
determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself and also not 
unequal with respect to another; it has no difference within it, nor any outwardly”. (G. 
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In this case, and also in the other two ‘fundamental ontological statements’, 
Lukács ascribes this first ontological statement to Marx.18 
According to Lukács, Marx’s second fundamental ontological statement 
is the fundamental ‘ontological statement’ of the objective nature of 
categories. The focus of Lukács’ argument is the concept that considers 
categories as subjective products created by the mind of the cognisant 
subject.19 He states: “The next, closely linked to this [the first ontological 
statement, author’s note], often introduced as a statement by Marx, is that 
categories express forms of being, determinations of existence”.20 With this 
Lukács wishes to emphasise Marx’s opposition to all forms of “gnoseological 
idealism” based on a concept of categories as mere “products of our mind 
regarding the establishment of being”.21 The third fundamental ontological 
                                                                                                                                                                              
W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, vol. I, Die objektive Logik, 1, Die Lehre vom Sein, 1812 
(2nd edition 1832), in HGW, vol. 21, p. 68-69, trans. G. Di Giovanni, The Science of 
Logic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 59).  
18 The quote Lukács refers to for his ‘fundamental ontological statement’ of 
‘objectivity’ is: “A being which does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural being, 
and plays no part in the system of nature. A being which has no object outside itself is not 
an objective being. A being which is not itself an object for some third being has no being 
for its object; i.e., it is not objectively related. Its being is not objective. A non-objective 
being is a non being” (K. Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 
1844 (“Erste Wiedergabe”), in MEGA2, sect. I, vol. 2, p. 296, trans. M. Milligan and D. J. 
Struik, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in MECW, vol. 3, p. 337). For the 
passages where Lukács refers to this excerpt in Marx, considered as the presentation of the 
“first fundamental ontological statement”, see Lukács, Prolegomena, p. 115; Id., Zur 
Ontologie I, in GLW, vol. 13, p. 578-579, trans. cit., The Ontology 2. Marx, p. 26; Id., Zur 
Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins II, in GLW, vol. 14, p. 502. 
19 The quote Lukács refers to his second ‘fundamental ontological statement’ 
regarding the objective factor of categories is: “Just as generally in the case of any historical, 
social science, so also in examining the development of economic categories it is always 
necessary to remember that the subject, in this context modern bourgeois society, is given, 
both in reality and in the mind, and that therefore the categories express forms of being, 
determination of existence – and sometimes only individual aspects – of this particular 
society, of this subject, and that even form the scientific standpoint it therefore by no 
means begins at the moment when it is first discussed as such. This has to be remembered 
because it provides the decisive criteria for the arrangement [of the material]” (Marx, 
Einleitung, p. 41; trans. cit., Introduction, p. 43). For textual references by Lukács to this 
excerpt in Marx, considered as a presentation of what he envisages as his second 
‘ontological statement’, see Lukács, Prolegomena, p. 237-238; ibid., p. 310-311 and Id., 
Zur Ontologie II, p. 171.  
20 “Die damit engst verbundene weitere, von uns ebenfalls oft angeführte 
Feststellung von Marx ist, daß die Kategorien Daseinsformen, Existenzbestimmungen 
sind” (Id., Prolegomena, p. 127).  
21 “Produkte unseres Denkens über die Beschaffenheit des Seins” (ibid.)  
Matteo Gargani 
 184 
statement is ‘historicity’, considered as the irreversible process to which all 
reality is subject.22 This is how Lukács presents the third statement:  
In our previous analysis, we have repeatedly underlined the third key moment, which 
we will discuss here. More precisely, and we reached this point only gradually, the 
world is to be conceived not in dualistic terms through opposition between “things” 
and “immaterial” energies, but as a complex, the inner interactions of which, like the 
dialectics of development, produce irreversible (and hence historical) processes.23  
There are many problems regarding the main thesis of the late Lukács 
about the existence in Marx of three – implicit – ontological statements. 
First and foremost, Marx never talks about ‘general ontology’. The load-
bearing structure of Marx’s strictly philosophical discourse is always to 
rethink metaphysics in light of the ‘Praxis’ concept. In addition, Lukács 
fully supports Marx’s objective. As a result, it is a genuine mistake to 
interpret Lukács’ late ontological “change of direction” in terms of a 
regression towards a form of pre-dialectic relationship between subject and 
object. The social-ontological perspective of the late Lukács is never an 
involution towards a concept of reality considered only as an Object in the 
sense criticised by Marx in his first Thesis on Feuerbach, but always as the 
end result of practical mediation.24 Lukács’ main statement is to use the 
ontological framework to delimit a genuine space for free action according 
to the terms of the ‘teleological positing [teleologische Setzung]’.25 
                                                                          
22 The quote referred to by Lukács for his third ‘fundamental ontological statement’ 
regarding historicity is: “We know only a single science, the science of history. One can 
look at history from two sides and divide it into the history of nature and the history of 
men” (K. Marx, F. Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie, 1845-1846 Posth., in MEW, vol. 3, p. 18, 
trans. C. Dutt, The German Ideology, in MECW, vol. 5, p. 28). For textual references by 
Lukács to this excerpt in Marx, considered as a presentation of what he envisages as his 
third ‘ontological assertion’, see Lukács, Prolegomena, p. 35; ibid., p. 107; Id., Zur 
Ontologie I, p. 562, trans. cit., The Ontology 2. Marx, p. 5.  
23 “Das dritte wesentliche Moment, das hier behandelt werden muß, ist in unseren 
bisherigen Analysen ebenfalls vielfach hervorgehoben worden. Nämlich, daß wir 
allmählich dazu gekommen sind, die Welt nicht dualistisch in der Form von »Dingen« 
(sowie verdinglichter Gedankengebilde) und »immateriellen« Energien aufzufassen, 
sondern als Komplexe, deren innere Wechselbeziehungen sowie Bewegungsdialektik 
irreversible (also historische) Prozesse auslösten” (Id., Prolegomena, p. 127-128).  
24 “The chief defect of all previous materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that 
things [Gegenstand], reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the object 
[Objekt], or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively” 
(K. Marx, Thesen über Feuerbach, 1845 Posth., in MEW, vol. 3, p. 533, trans. Unknown, 
Theses on Feuerbach, in MECW, vol. 5, p. 3).  
25 “Through labour, a teleological positing is realized within material being, as the 
rise of a new objectivity. The first consequence of this is that labour becomes the model 
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One more important consideration has to be introduced into this 
discussion about these three ‘fundamental ontological statements’. Lukács 
often tries to illustrate his idea of being – objective, irreversible and 
individual – by indirectly referring to Leibniz’s concept of substance 
considered as ‘monad’. He does not explicitly cite it, but in key passages of 
his late considerations, he refers to Leibniz’s famous principle of the so-
called ‘Identity of Indiscernibles’: “Like generality, individuality is precisely 
one of the fundamental categories of every being: There is no being who 
does not also exist as an example of its species (general) and as individual 
objectivity (individual). Leibniz has demonstrated this using his famous 
anecdote of the leaves and ladies-in-waiting”.26 
Lukács therefore states that the only basis compatible not only with 
the Weltbild elaborated from the three fundamental ontological 
statements, but also with the need to maintain the key role of praxis in the 
relationship with reality is a monadological concept of reality.27 Hence, 
Leibniz’s ‘monad’ and not an inexistent – or at least very difficult to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
for any social practice, for in such social practice – no matter how ramified ist mediations 
– teleological positings are always realized, and ultimately realized materially” (G. Lukács, 
Zur Ontologie II, p. 12, trans. D. Fernbach, The Ontology of Social Being 3. The Labour, 
London, Merlin, 1980, p. 3).  
26 “Einzelheit ist nämlich, ebenso wie Allgemeinheit, eine der Grundkategorien eines 
jeden Seins: es gibt kein Seiendes, das nicht zugleich als Exemplar seiner Gattung 
(allgemein) und als einzelne Gegenständlichkeit (einzelnes) existieren würde. Leibniz hat 
dies nach einer berühmten Anekdote der Hofdamen an den Pflanzblättern demonstriert” 
(Id., Prolegomena, p. 44). On the same point, see also ibid., p. 285; Id., Zur Ontologie I, p. 
357-358; Id., Zur Ontologie II, p. 243 and Id., Gelebtes Denken, p. 197; trans. cit., Record of 
a Life, p. 142. The anecdote to which Lukács refers, but without ever providing any 
textual reference, is present in Leibniz’s fourth letter to Samuel Clarke (26 May 1716): 
“There is no such things as two individuals indiscernible from each other. An ingenious 
gentleman of my acquaintance, discoursing with me in the presence of Her Electoral 
Highness, the Princess Sophia, in the garden of Herrenhausen, thought he could find two 
leaves perfectly alike. The princess defied him to do it, and he ran all over the garden a 
long time to look for some; but it was to no purpose. Two drops of water or milk, viewed 
with a microscope, will appear distinguishable from each other. This is an argument 
against atoms, which are confuted, as well as vacuum, by the principles of true 
metaphysics” (Streitschriften zwischen Leibniz und Clarke 1715-1716, in G.F. Leibniz, Die 
philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz, ed. C. I. Gerhardt, Hildesheim, Olms, 1978, 
vol. VII, p. 372, trans. L. E. Loemker, The Controversy between Leibniz and Clarke, in Id., 
Philosophical Papers and Letters, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1989, p. 687).  
27 Leibniz’s role in most of Lukács’ late ontological works has been neglected by 
those who have interpreted his works. Rockmore is the only person to have commented 
briefly. See T. Rockmore, Irrationalism. Lukács and the Marxist View of Reason, 
Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1992, p. 229.  
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directly obtain – ‘ontology’ by Marx would in many ways problematically 
seem to be the true basis of the late Lukács’ ‘general ontology’.  
3. Uneven development and the Marxist aesthetics  
During his first long sojourn in Moscow (December 1929-Summer 1931) 
Lukács worked as a researcher at the ‘Marx-Engels Institute’. The Director 
David B. Rjazanov introduced him to Mikhail A. Lifshits, a twenty-five 
year old collaborator at the Institute.28 The idea to reveal the fragmentary, 
but in their opinion extant ‘Marxist aesthetics’, emerged gradually during 
their conservations. The idea they shared during that period was that this 
aesthetics came from the possibility to identify its independent theoretical 
fundamentals, in other words without ‘integrating’ it with ideas taken from 
other philosophies.29 Their joint intellectual efforts led to the publication 
of Lifshits’s book The Philosophy of Art of Karl Marx (1932) and, in the 
thirties, several papers by Lukács on issues relating to aesthetics. The first 
Russian edition of the Marx-Engels anthology, On Art and Literature, was 
edited by Mikhail A. Lifshits and published in 1933.30 
Nevertheless, Lukács immediately realised that an independent 
Marxist aesthetics cannot exist without a more general Marxist philosophy 
considered as Weltanschauung. While trying to establish an independent 
Marxist aesthetics Lukács reflected on the nature of Marx’s – not 
immediately existent – philosophy. Even then, Lukács was well aware that 
an anthology of citations on art and literature was not enough to build a 
                                                                          
28 For the historical context, see L. Sziklai, After the Proletarian Revolution. Georg 
Lukács’s Marxist Development 1930-1945, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1992, p. 66-67.  
29 G. Lukács, Nachwort, 1970, in GLW, vol. 4, p. 676. On the same point cf. also Id., 
Gelebtes Denken, p. 123-124, trans. cit., Record of a Life, p. 86-87 and also Lukács’ last 
letter to Lifshits (17 June 1970) in E. Pavlov, “Review of Mikhail Lifshits and György 
Lukács Perepiska [Letters]”, Historical Materialism, 20 (4), 2012, p. 195.  
30 See M. Lifshits, Esteticheskie vzglyady Marksa, 1932, trans. R. B. Winn, The 
Philosophy of Art of Karl Marx, London, Pluto Press, 1973 and F. Lifshits, F. Schiller, 
Marx i Engels o isskustwe i Literature, Moscow, Sovetskaja Literatura, 1933. About M. 
Lifshits, see S. Mitchell, “Mikhail Alexandrovich Lifshits (1905-1983)”, Oxford Art 
Journal, 20 (2), 1997, p. 23-41 and A. Maidansky, V. Oittinen, “Mikhail Lifshits. An 
enigmatic Marxist”, Studies in East European Thought, 68 (4), 2016, p. 241-246. For a 
retrospective account on the relationship between Lukács and Lifshits, see M. Lifshits, L. 
Sziklai, Moszkvai évek Lukács Györggyel. Beszélgetések, emlékezések, Budapest, Gondolat, 
1989, trans. B. Mai, Interview mit Michail Lifšic. (22. November 1974; 2. Gespräch), in A. 
Hiersche, E. Kowalski (eds.), Literaturkritik in der frühsowjetischen Diskussion. 
Dokumente, Bern, Peter Lang, 1993, p. 403-421.  
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Marxist aesthetics. In the preface to The Specificity of Aesthetics, Lukács 
clearly illustrates the whole picture: 
When I wrote my first contribution to the Aesthetics of Marxism about thirty years 
ago, I advocated the thesis that Marxism had its own aesthetics, and my view met 
with considerable resistance. The reason was that, prior to Lenin, Marxism, even in 
its best theoretical representatives such as Plechanov or Mehring, limited itself 
almost entirely to the problems of historical materialism. Only since Lenin has 
dialectical materialism returned to the centre of interest. This is why Mehring, who 
incidentally based his aesthetics on Kant’s “Critique of Judgement”, could see in the 
divergences between Marx – Engels and Lassalle no more than the clash of subjective 
judgements of taste. This controversy has, of course, long been solved. Since the 
brilliant study by M. Lifshits on the evolution of the aesthetics views of Marx, since 
his careful collection and systematization of the scattered utterances of Marx, Engels 
and Lenin on aesthetic questions, there can be no more doubt about the connection 
and cohesion of their train of thought. However, the demonstration and proof of 
such a systematic connection is still far from solving with finality the demand for an 
aesthetics of Marxism. If aesthetics or at least its perfect skeleton were explicitly 
included in the collected and systematically arranged utterances of the classics of 
Marxism, then nothing but a good running commentary would be needed in order 
to present us with a complete Marxist aesthetics. But there can be no question of 
this! Ample experience shows that not even a direct monographic application of this 
material to each particular question can provide what is scientifically essential for the 
construction of the whole. One has to face the paradoxical situation that a Marxist 
aesthetics does exist and does not exist at one and the same time, that it still has to be 
conquered, even created through independent research, and that the result still only 
presents and fixes something already existing conceptually.31 
Thirty years were to pass before Lukács explicitly admitted that an – 
immediate – Marxist aesthetics did not exist. Nevertheless, Lukács’ essays 
in the thirties focusing on Franz Mehring, Theodor R. Vischer and 
Friedrich Schiller are all based on the methodological requisite to test the 
fundamental principles of that aesthetics.32 For Lukács, its key element 
resided in acknowledging the cognitive value of art33 (this is more than 
                                                                          
31 G. Lukács, Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, in GLW, vol. 11, p. 16-17, trans. 
Unknown, “Introduction to a Monograph on Aesthetics”, The New Hungarian Quarterly, 
14, 1964, p. 60-61.  
32 See Id., Franz Mehring (1846-1919); Id., Zur Ästhetik Schillers, 1935, in GLW, 
vol. 10; Id., Karl Marx und Friedrich Theodor Vischer, 1934, in GLW, vol. 10. The most 
important contribution by Lukács during that period involved establishing the 
fundamentals of an independent Marxist aesthetics from a purely theoretical point of 
view, in Id., Kunst und objektive Wahrheit.  
33 “The theory of reflection provides the common basis for all forms of theoretical 
and practical mastery of reality through consciousness. Thus it is also the basis for the 
theory of the artistic reflection of reality. In this discussion, we will seek to elaborate the 
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evident even as far back as his essays in the thirties). This thesis is part of 
the basic idea behind Lukács’ considerations in the fifties and sixties 
according to which art, science and everyday life are three different ‘types 
of reflections’ of the same reality, each one operating through its own 
specificity.34 This is the meaning of the term ‘specificity’, which is therefore 
also the ‘specificity’ of forms of knowledge that appears in the title of his 
book On the Specificity of Aesthetics published in 1963.35 
The main theoretical rival of Marxist aesthetics that Lukács decides to 
create from 1930 onwards is the concept of art as a phenomenon that can 
be entirely explained by a certain economic order. Lukács writes at length 
about the concept of the ‘specificity of aesthetics’ in the work published 
with that title in 1963. Using this concept he tries to complete his task, 
distancing himself from any form of basis-superstructure interpretative 
model. In other words, he uses ‘specificity’ to understand the aesthetic 
phenomenon as endowed with its own immanent legality, one which 
determines its genesis and forms of manifestation in terms not immediately 
referable to the social and economic context in which it occurs. 
Establishing the specific legality of the aesthetic phenomenon is the 
methodological key that allows Lukács to also analogically question the 
‘specificity’ of other social fields. In essence, the ‘specificity’ of the aesthetic 
phenomenon acts as a methodological trailblazer, i.e., it indicates a 
functioning dynamics also vis-à-vis other forms of ‘specificity’ (of everyday 
life, politics, the law and science) in their relationship with the social 
whole. Unlike the aesthetic phenomenon, Lukács did not write extensively 
about other forms of ‘specificity’: nevertheless, he considered the Ontology 
of Social Being as a basic framework for future studies. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
specific aspects of artistic reflection within the scope of the general theory” (Id., Kunst und 
objektive Wahrheit, p. 607, trans. cit., Art and Objective Truth, p. 25).  
34 “The significance of the break thus brought about with every kind of philosophical 
idealism becomes even more obvious in its consequences if we further concretize our 
materialistic point of departure, viz., if we comprehend art a peculiar manifestation of the 
reflection of reality, a manifestation which itself is but one among various forms of the 
universal relationship of man to reality, of man’s reflection of reality. One of the most 
decisive basic ideas of this work is that all types of reflection – we analyse primarily those 
of everyday life, science and of art – always picture the same objective reality” (Id., Die 
Eigenart I, p. 22, trans. cit., Introduction, p. 65). 
35 Id., Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, in GLW, vols. 11-12.  
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4. Uneven development and ideology  
‘Uneven development’ and the ‘ideological’ use of the historical past are 
two obstacles Lukács cannot avoid when he tries to establish the basis of 
Marxist aesthetics. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte and its 
initial world-famous words is the text in which these two elements clearly 
co-exist.36 Marx states: 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not 
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly 
encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead 
generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they 
seem engaged in revolutionising themselves and things, in creating something that 
has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously 
conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, 
battle-cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this 
time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language. Thus Luther donned the mask 
of the Apostle Paul, the revolution of 1789-1814 draped itself alternately as the 
Roman Republic and the Roman Empire, and the Revolution of 1848 knew nothing 
better to do than to parody, now 1789, now the revolutionary tradition of 1793 to 
1795. In like manner a beginner who has learnt a new language always translates it 
back into his mother tongue, but he assimilates the spirit of the new language and 
expresses himself freely in it only when he finds his way in it without recalling the 
old and forgets his native tongue in the use of the new.37  
Marx formulates several general theories vis-à-vis the socio-political use of 
the past, in other words he tackles the problems traditionally part of the 
field of ideology. Taking Marx as a basis, Lukács maintains that the use of 
the past always corresponds to socio-political needs prompted by the 
present (but to find an explicit explanation of this statement we have to 
wait until The Ontology of Social Being). This is the reason why all efforts to 
recover the past in its original form is, from the very start, doomed to 
failure: “human actions have results different from those envisaged in their 
                                                                          
36 “It is part of the ontological nature of social being that all the directions, 
tendencies, etc. that appear in it are made up of individual acts of an alternative nature. In 
the arts, where the overwhelming majority of objectifications that have to be considered 
are directly the product of individual acts, this general structure must attain a particular 
importance, i.e. the law of uneven development here affects the individual acts themselves 
in a still more profound and decisive fashion” (Id., Zur Ontologie I, p. 662, trans. cit., The 
Ontology 2. Marx, p. 132-133). Cf. also Id., Prolegomena, p. 231-232 and Id., Zur 
Ontologie II, p. 421-422. 
37 K. Marx, Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, 1852, in MEGA2, sect. I, 
vol. 11, p. 96, trans. C. Dutt, R. Livingstone, C. Upward, The Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Bonaparte, in MECW, vol. 11, p. 103-104.  
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subjective goals, and that therefore – speaking very roughly and generally – 
men usually make history with a false consciousness”.38  
Lukács’ considerations about recovering the past are part of a more 
general attempt to determine the nature of the ideology. He states that 
ideology has nothing to do with the dimension of ‘false consciousness’, or 
the need to close an alleged gap between reality and its subjective 
cognisance. In fact, he states: “Ideology not (in a gnoseological form) as 
‘false consciousness’, but (in continuity with Marx’s doctrine) as a means to 
acquire consciousness and combat the social conflicts that take place 
within the framework of economic development”.39 Based on this unique 
interpretation of Marx’s ideology, Lukács comes to the following conclusion: 
“This comprehensive definition by Marx – and this is the most important 
aspect of its broad usability – does not provide a univocal answer to the 
question of the methodological and objective accuracy or inaccuracy of 
ideologies. They are both possible”.40 Marx believes that ideology is the 
means with which men achieve and at the same time mystify real social 
conflicts. This is why Marx can legitimately qualify the references made to 
classical Rome by the revolutionaries in 1789 as parodistic: 
But unheroic as bourgeois society is, it nevertheless took heroism, sacrifice, terror, 
civil war and battle of peoples to bring it into being. And in the classically austere 
traditions of the Roman Republic its gladiators found the ideals and the art forms, 
the self-deceptions that they needed in order to conceal from themselves the 
                                                                          
38 G. Lukács, Zur Ontologie I, p. 662, trans. cit., The Ontology 2. Marx, p. 133.  
39 “Ideologie nicht (erkenntnistheoretisch) als »falsches Bewußtsein«, sondern 
(nach der Lehre von Marx) als Mittel zum Bewußtmachen und Ausfechten der von der 
ökonomischen Entwicklung aufgeworfenen Konflikte verstanden wird” (Id., Prolegomena, 
p. 291). See also ibid., p. 71n. The quote from Marx to which Lukács refers is: “The 
changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the 
whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is always necessary to 
distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of 
production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, 
political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men 
become conscious of this conflict and fight it out” (K. Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen 
Oekonomie, 1859, in MEGA2, sect. II, vol. 2, p. 101, trans. S. Ryazanskaya, A Contribution 
to the Critique of Political Economy, in MECW, vol. 29, p. 263).  
40 “Diese umfassende Bestimmung von Marx — und das ist das wichtigste Moment 
ihrer weitreichenden Verwendbarkeit — gibt auf die Frage der methodologischen und 
sachlichen Richtigkeit oder Falschheit der Ideologien gar keine eindeutige Antwort. 
Beides ist praktisch gleich möglich” (Lukács, Prolegomena, p. 10).  
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bourgeois limitations of the content of their struggles and to maintain their passion 
on the high plane of great historical tragedy.41  
Identity and difference is the form of relationship linking the ‘specificity’ of 
a determinate artistic genre to a determinate society; this is 
methodologically true even for everyday life, politics, law and science. 
These categories should be understood as ‘determinations of reflection’ (as 
defined by Hegel), i.e., one without the other is senseless, “determinations 
reflected into themselves”.42 On the one hand, ‘uneven development’ 
expresses the identity between determinate artistic, everyday, political, 
juridical and scientific phenomena and the society that creates them. On 
the other hand, the concept of ‘uneven development’ underscores a 
difference between these countless practical phenomena and the society in 
which they exist. By using ‘specificity’ to imagine the genesis and 
evolutionary methods of multiple practical phenomena they can be 
understood as an ensemble not linked to economics, albeit without 
abstracting them altogether from the latter. 
5. Misconception. A necessary consequence of uneven development  
On 11 June 1861 Marx wrote to Ferdinand Lassalle to thank him for 
sending his recently published book, System of Vested Rights. Marx took the 
opportunity to send a few critical comments to Lassalle about the genesis of 
the ‘complete testamentary freedom’ he believes was established by the 
‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688.43 Marx’s observations triggered a fully-
fledged querelle between the two authors. On the first of July 1861 Lassalle 
replied stating that the English testamentary right is based on a 
‘misconception’ of the Roman testamentary right: “So the English have 
                                                                          
41 Marx, Der achtzehnte, p. 97-98, trans. cit., The Eighteenth, p. 104-105.  
42 Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, vol. I, Die objektive Logik, 2, Die Lehre vom Wesen, 
1813, in HGW, vol. 11, p. 258, trans. cit., The Science of Logic, p. 354. About this point, 
see V. Verra, Le determinazioni della riflessione nella Scienza della logica di Hegel, in Id., Su 
Hegel, a c. di C. Cesa, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2007, p. 120-121.  
43 “English law has taken a course diametrically opposed to that of French law. 
Complete testamentary freedom (whereby non Englishman or Yankee is compelled to 
leave his family a farthing) dates back to the bourgeois revolution of 1688 and evolved in 
the same measure as ‘bourgeois’ property developed in England. Thus, it would seem after 
all that, aside from its specifically Roman origins, etc., complete testamentary freedom, 
indeed the making of wills generally, is a delusion which, in bourgeois society too, must 
have roots of its own, independent of mythology, etc.” (Marx to Lassalle, 11 June, 1861, in 
MEGA2, sect. III, vol. 11, p. 494, trans. P. and B. Ross, Letters, in MECW, vol. 41, p. 294).  
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also based their will on Roman law and, by misinterpreting it, have 
imitated it – you cannot deny this”.44 On 22 July 1861 Marx again wrote to 
Lassalle rejecting in toto Lassalle’s theory of this ‘misunderstanding’. 
Although explicitly pressed by his interlocutor, Marx never raised the issue 
ever again.45 It’s worth citing Marx’s position verbatim: 
You have shown that the adoption of the Roman will originally rested on a 
misconception [Mißverständniß] (and still does, so far as the sagacity of learned 
jurists is concerned). But it by no means follows from this that the will in its modern 
form – no matter with what misconceptions of Roman law modern jurists may 
construe it – is the misconceived Roman will. If this were so, it might be said that 
every attainment of an earlier age adopted by a later one is a misunderstanding of the 
past. It is certain, for instance, that the 3 unities, as theoretically construed by the 
French dramatists in Louis XIV’s day, rest on a misconception of Greek drama (and 
of Aristotle as the exponent thereof). On the other hand, it is equally certain that 
they understood the Greeks in a way that corresponded exactly to their own artistic 
needs. Hence their continued adherence to this so-called ‘classical’ drama long after 
Dacier and others had provided them with a correct interpretation of Aristotle. It is 
also certain that all modern constitutions are largely based on a misconception of the 
English constitution, adopting as essential precisely that which appears to be 
declining in the English constitution – and which continues to exist in England in 
name only per abusum – e.g. a so-called responsible cabinet. The misunderstood form 
is precisely the general one. It is the one that lends itself to general use at a certain 
stage in the development of society.46  
On 9 December 1861 Marx wrote to Engels about Lassalle’s theory: 
“Ideologism permeates everything, and the dialectical method is wrongly 
                                                                          
44 “Daß auch die Engländer ihr Testament immer aus dem Römischen Recht 
aufgenommen u. ihm, mißverstehend, nachgebildet – das wirst Du auch nicht leugnen 
können” (Lassalle to Marx, 1 July, 1861, in MEGA2, sect. III, vol. 11, p. 519).  
45 Lassalle wrote a long letter (28 July 1861) in reply to Marx’s letter dated 22 July 
1861, see ibid., p. 548-553. On 25 August Lassalle again writes to Marx complaining that 
he has not replied, see ibid., p. 563, and yet again a few months later (22 November 1861), 
see ibid. p. 602-603. Marx waited until 28 April 1862 before referring to this issue again, 
see MEGA2, sect. III, vol. 12, p. 77-79, trans. cit., Letters, in MECW, vol. 41, p. 356-357. 
In his letter Marx caustically suggests that Lassalle read Vico’s Scienza Nuova (regrettably, 
he adds, in the French version since Lassalle does not speak Italian!) and cites several 
excerpts about testamentary law written by Vico.  
46 Marx to Lassalle, 22 July 1861, in MEGA2, sect. III, vol. 11, p. 544, trans. cit., 
Letters, in MECW, vol. 41, p. 317-318. Already in 1925, Lukács quotes the passage, see 
Id., Die neue Ausgabe von Lassalles Briefen (Rezension), 1925, in GLW, vol. 2, p. 636, 
trans. M. McColgan, The New Edition of Lassalle’s Letters, in Id., Tactics and Ethics 1919-
1929, London, Verso, 2014, p. 173-174. About this letter, see G.M. Cazzaniga, Marx e 
l’idea di progresso, in G.M. Cazzaniga, D. Losurdo, L. Sichirollo (eds.), Marx e i suoi critici, 
Urbino, QuattroVenti, 1987, p. 62, n. 15.  
Uneven Development and Weltanschauung 
 193 
applied. Hegel never described as dialectics the subsumption of vast 
numbers of ‘cases’ under a general principle”.47 Marx clearly sets out what 
he considers is the main problem inherent in the System of Vested Rights: 
the misunderstanding about the genuine nature of the ‘dialectics’ is the 
reason prompting Lassalle to consider a ‘misconception’ the relationship 
between post-1688 English testamentary right and the original Roman 
testamentary right. 
Lukács often cites this querelle between Marx and Lassalle, 
emphasising how Marx’s theory, according to which “the misunderstood 
form is precisely the general one”, is in actual fact an element that 
conceptually follows on from the theory of uneven development:  
Marx goes on directly to deal with uneven development. He shows in particular that 
in the continuity of historical development the attempts to grasp a legal 
phenomenon in thought and to transform it into practice are time and again 
conducted in the form of regression to institutions from earlier eras and their 
interpretation, and in fact must be conducted.48  
As a result, the law of historical evolution of the juridical phenomenon vis-
à-vis the overall changes in society must be reconstructed only post festum 
and does not follow any logic formulated a priori.49 Lassalle assumes that 
once the essence of the concept (of testamentary law) has been understood, 
it is possible to find it throughout history:  
And precisely for this reason it has been our goal for now on to tackle the essence of 
testamentary law, in the first place Roman law, precisely to draw back the sensitive 
veils that conceal it; these veils have up to now hindered knowledge [of the essence], 
and reveal its pure soul through material reality.50  
                                                                          
47 Marx to Engels, 9 December 1861, in MEGA2, sect. III, vol. 11, p. 616, trans. cit., 
Letters, in MECW, vol. 41, p. 333.  
48 Lukács, Zur Ontologie I, p. 656, trans. cit., Ontology 2. Marx, p. 126.  
49 Lukács explicitly interprets this exchange between Marx and Lassalle as the 
theoretical explanation of Marx’s theory of ‘uneven development’, see ibid., p. 655-660, 
trans. cit., The Ontology 2. Marx, p. 123-129. 
50 “Ebendeshalb mußte es unsere Aufgabe sein, nachfolgend das Wesen des 
Erbrechtes – und zwar zunächst des römischen – zu schreiben, d.h. diesem gesamten 
Institute überall den verhüllenden sinnlicher Schleier abzureißen, welcher dasselbe bisher 
der Erkenntnis entrückt hat, und seine reine Seele überall durch das Stoffliche hindurch 
zur durchsichtigen Erscheinung zu bringen” (F. Lassalle, Das System von erworbenen 
Rechte II,1, 1860, In Id., Gesammelte Reden und Schriften, ed. E. Bernstein, Berlin, Paul 
Cassirer, 1920, vol. 11, p. 13).  
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Lassalle’s method involves starting from an abstract, non-historical 
universality and only later trying to find it in history. As a result, history is 
merely the place where the concept, formulated elsewhere, is exhibited. 
However, by using this method Lassalle precludes it from acquiring a concrete 
and not merely formal universality. This is precisely what Marx criticises. 
This kind of philosophical-methodological basis inevitably leads Lassalle to 
consider history as a space in which misunderstood uses of a conceptual 
universality (created at the start and not acquired gradually and concretely) 
follow on from one another, i.e., that develop and evolve over the ages.  
Lassalle works with testamentary law as if it were a concept already 
created ab origine; accordingly, as a definition it acts as a premise. However, 
in principle Lassalle precludes any possible form of concrete universality. In 
this case the meaning of the adjective concrete is the one attributed to it by 
Marx in his Introduction in 1857: “The concrete is concrete because it is a 
synthesis of many determinations, thus a unity of the diverse”.51  
Two possible interpretative models of historical materialism – identity 
and difference – derive from the problem of the historical misinterpretation 
tackled by Marx and Lassalle in their correspondence. Identity is a vulgarised 
version of historical materialism that considers society as a historically 
evolving system in which the ‘specificity’ of the various social fields is 
understood simply by linking these fields to the economics they embody. 
The latter, difference, is followed by those who reject historical materialism sic 
et simpliciter and instead eulogise a ‘difference’ based on the need to consider 
those social fields as a completion not linked to production. Lukács realises 
that both these interpretations lead to a dead end. This is why he focuses so 
intensely on the category of ‘particularity’.52 According to Lukács, 
particularity is the decisive category mediating between universality and 
individuality. Hence ‘particularity’ and ‘specificity’ represent the fields 
which in the future will have to be examined in order to free Marxist 
Weltbild from schematic and reductionist errors. 
 
 
                                                                          
51 Marx, Einleitung, p. 36, trans. cit., Introduction, p. 38.  
52 G. Lukács, Über die Besonderheit als Kategorie der Ästhetik, 1956, in GLW, vol. 10, 
p. 597-638.  
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Conclusions 
Lukács considers uneven development as the context in which the category 
of ‘specificity’ is historically and socially manifest. In fact, the former is the 
typical form of reciprocal relations between the chief social fields during 
historical evolution (art, science, law and everyday life). Recalling the 
terminology of the letter to Werner Hofmann cited at the beginning of this 
essay, we can say that ‘uneven development’ is the reason why social ‘laws’ are 
imposed and yet are also constantly disproved by facts, and thus exposed as 
‘trends’. Lukács does not consider that the constitutive shift of ‘laws’ into 
‘trends’ involves eliminating sic et simpliciter the attempt to identify 
determinate constants of development and legality in the relationship 
between economic progress and corresponding changes in major social fields. 
Instead he is obsessed with establishing determinate legality without, 
however, loosing sight of the irreversible process of the historical and social 
substratum in which these fields are produced and evolve. 
 
Acknowledgments: I am grateful to Erika Young for the English translation.  
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